at the same time, for example, when someone performs an action they can see, or during 141 synchronous social interactions (Heyes & Ray, 2000) . These sensory-motor associations are 142 created prior to imitation, and facilitate imitation when an action is observed at a later time. 143 Other stimuli may facilitate the link between sensory and motor action units, for example, the 144 vocalized word "smile" may become associated with both the performance of a smile and the 145 observation of someone else smiling, facilitating an indirect association between sensory and 146 motor representations of an action (analogous to the indices described by Piaget). It may be 147 that this indirect route to forming an association might be especially important when an action 148 is opaque (e.g., facial expressions). More recently, the ASL approach has been applied to 149 explain mirror neurons where sensory and motor representations are instead discussed as 150 sensory and motor neurons (Heyes, 2010) . Connections between neurons develop through 151 sensorimotor experience and after an association has been created a motor neuron may fire 152 solely upon seeing an action being performed. This model is gathering empirical support from 153 studies of adult humans through the analyses of automatic imitation effects. 154 Automatic imitation is a stimulus-response compatibility effect that is detected when 155 the presentation of an action stimulus (e.g., a picture of a hand opening) facilitates the 156 performance of that action and interferes with the execution of an opposite action (e.g., closing participants are required to respond to action stimuli with incompatible actions (e.g., closing found that after training participants to move their foot after seeing a hand move (and vice 170 versa), activation in brain areas associated with mirror neuron function for specific actions 171 (e.g., hand movement) were activated by seeing moving images of the other effector (e.g., foot 172 movement). This suggests that experience of contiguous sensory-motor activity forges 173 connections between representations of actions that can be observed at the neurophysiological 174 level, even if the sensory and motor actions are different. Support for the ASL model is growing 175 based on experimental studies with adults; however, for the model to be useful it must take into 176 account the real social experience of infants and children, and explain whether this experience 177 can facilitate the development of imitation. 178 A crucial aspect of the ASL approach to imitation is that experience is essential for 179 connections between sensory and motor representations to form, and while this has been during infancy the next step is to observe the effect of this type of interaction on behavior.
197
In the current study we aimed to test specific predictions of the ASL approach with phenomena similar to automatic imitation in children aged between three and seven was 201 developed. The decision to study children already possessing imitative ability was largely due 202 to a methodological necessity; in this study children were required to perform different actions 203 after seeing an action stimulus, and previous studies have found that young children (aged 204 three-four) struggle with this task (see pilot study reported in Simpson & Riggs, 2011). The 205 task used in this study required participants to make one of two actions in response to an action 206 performed by an experimenter. Four different actions were used: hand clapping, hand waving, 207 hand closing (i.e., making a fist), and finger pointing. One game required participants to clap 208 or wave, while the other game required participants to create a fist or point. In compatible 209 conditions participants were asked to respond with the same action as the experimenter, and 210 during incompatible conditions they were asked to perform the opposite action. Each , however, the primary aim of our study was to 214 predict specific automatic imitation effects based on the ASL hypothesis. 215 Note, we describe the stimulus-response compatibility effects under investigation in 216 this article as automatic imitation, however, this term, as defined in the broader cognitive 217 literature, is operationally different, occurring only when compatibility effects are influenced 218 by task-irrelevant stimuli; that is, when participants are required to respond discriminatorily to 219 non-action stimuli (e.g., shapes, colors, etc.), and so compatibility effects induced by task-220 irrelevant action stimuli are "automatic" in the sense of being unrelated to the task-221 requirements. In the current study, on the other hand, the stimulus-set and response-set are the 222 same (i.e., children respond with action responses to compatible or incompatible action 223 stimuli), and so the compatibility effect cannot be said to be automatic in the same sense. In 224 the comparative literature, however, the term automatic imitation is used more broadly, and 225 also refers to contexts where animals learn to respond to action stimulus-response associations 226 more easily when the stimulus (e.g., a hand action) is congruent with the reinforced response response sets consist of the same actions), and any delays or mistakes caused by the task-231 instructions will be unintentional. Furthermore, we predict that underlying mechanism 232 resulting in the any potential differences across action-sets observed in our own study would 233 be the same as those mechanisms driving the effects found in adult studies, and therefore we 234 chose to use the same term, automatic imitation, when describing this stimulus-response 235 compatibility effect.
236
The action sets used in this study were chosen based on two criteria. First, all actions 237 had to be simple to perform. Second, it was expected that children would have more experience 238 of performing two of the actions in a socially synchronous or imitative context. To our 239 knowledge, no previous study has described the frequency of specific synchronized behavior 240 in childhood and therefore these actions were chosen through a thoughtful consideration of 241 actions regularly imitated during social interactions. Clapping and waving, for example, are 242 performed socially during applause and when saying goodbye respectively. Indeed, clapping 243 specifically is often described as occurring in a group context (e.g., Repp, 1987) . On the other 
249
Our first prediction based on the ASL approach to imitation is that automatic imitation 250 effects (i.e., the difference in reaction time between imitating actions and performing different 251 actions) will be greater for actions that have been performed in synchrony in past interactions.
252
The ASL approach predicts that external stimuli may facilitate the association of visual and 253 motor properties of an action. We may then predict that an automatic imitation effect may be 254 stronger for an action that produces other non-visual stimuli. The only action that produces a 255 non-visual stimulus is clapping which also produces sound, and so we predict that the automatic 256 imitation effect will be greatest for this action. Finally, if automatic imitation effects develop 257 through imitative or synchronous experience, it follows that short periods of counter-imitative 258 experience preceding imitation trials will increase reaction time when imitating. If this is the 259 case we should find that when incompatible experimental trials precede imitative trials that 260 automatic imitation effects will be suppressed. It is difficult to predict whether, or how, age Over the course of a research session four different games were played using two 288 different sets of actions. For two of the games, participants had to produce actions that are 289 commonly imitated or performed in synchrony during social interaction (we will refer to these 290 actions as the Commonly Imitated Set, or CIS). The actions chosen for the CIS were "wave" 291 and "clap" (see Figure 1 , A-B), as children are likely to clap their hands in synchrony during 292 applause, and waving is also a socially synchronous behavior performed when waving 293 goodbye. The actions performed in the other action set (which we will call the Rarely Imitated 294 Set, or RIS) were "point" and "fist" (see Figure 1 , C-D), as these actions are not considered to 295 be socially-coordinated. 296 Using a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm two different games were played The experimenter demonstrated the two actions to be performed in the first game and 316 asked the participant if they were also able to perform each of the two actions: E.g., "Can you 317 wave your hands like this". Next, the experimenter explained the response rule for each of the with verbal praise, and if both responses were correct the child progressed to the testing phase. 326 If the child did not perform two consecutive correct responses after four pre-test trials the child 327 progressed to the testing phase nonetheless. If these children passed the criteria for inclusion 328 (see below), their data was included in the analysis.
329
The testing phase consisted of ten response trials presented in a pseudorandomized 330 order. Children were told to react as quickly as possible. To begin a trial both experimenter and 331 participant placed their hands flat on the sheet of paper; if the child did not have their hands on 332 the paper they were prompted to do so (e.g., "hands flat", "hands on the paper"). The 333 experimenter would rapidly perform an action, return his hands to the starting position, and 334 wait for the child to respond. During this testing phase correct responses were not praised and 335 incorrect responses were not corrected by the experimenter. If an incorrect action was 336 performed the experimenter would wait for approximately two seconds for the child to change 337 their action. Between trials, children were encouraged to prepare themselves for the next trials 338 with various verbal cues including "hands flat", "ready", and "next one". After the tenth trial 339 the child was praised for his or her performance, and told that the game was to be played again 340 but with different rules. The procedure described above was then repeated but with the response 341 rules reversed. After completing ten test trials with both response rules, the same overall 342 process was repeated with the different action set. The order of the games was counterbalanced 343 for both response rule and action set. However, due to the removal of some participants (see (we included these corrected trials, as we felt that this change of action indicated that the child 358 understood the rule for that trial). However, we also recorded the number of "mistakes" made 359 per condition, considering both incorrect trials and corrected trials. We felt this measure better 360 captured an automatic response to a stimulus, and therefore was relevant to the study of 361 automatic imitation. This measure of mistakes was analyzed when examining automatic 362 imitation effects.
363
A measure of reaction time started once an action was completed by the experimenter 364 and ended once the completion criteria was met by the participant (see Table 1 for definitions 365 of action completion), and these measures were kept consistent across all participants. Reaction 366 time measurements were not taken for trials when an incorrect response was performed, Table 1 372 Definitions used to begin and end a measurement of reaction time on a given trial. To examine what was driving these AI differences we examined RTs for compatible 462 and incompatible responses for each stimulus separately. We performed two one-way repeated Cohen's d = 0.64; see Figure 4 ). However, comparing the effect-sizes from these two tests 506 identifies no significant difference between these results (Z= 1.32, p = .188). Furthermore, 507 when a three-way interaction between the automatic-imitation effect, order of rules, and action 508 set was examined using a Linear Mixed Model, a significant interaction was not found (X²(1) 509 = 2.21; p = 0.137; see Table 1 , Supplementary Materials) , again, suggesting that while order 510 effects are different across conditions, this difference is not statistically significant.
511

Age effects 512
Age was not significantly correlated with AI effect in either the commonly imitated 513 action set (r = -.11, p = .432) or the rarely imitated action set (r = .06, p = .681), and any 514 difference between AI effects (calculated by subtracting a participant's AI effect in the RIS 515 from the CIS effect), similarly, did not vary across age (r = -.14, p = .311). RTs to compatible 516 rules in both action conditions quickened with age (rcis = -.50, p < .001; rris = -.45, p < .001; 517 see Figure 5 ), and similarly, incompatible responses quickened with age (rcis = -.40, p = .003; 518 rris = -.39, p = .004; see Figure 5 ). As all RTs were strongly correlated with age, we performed 519 a correlation between AI effects for both action sets and age while partialling out the effect of 520 a participant's mean RT performance; we found no relationship between age and the AI effect 521 for the commonly imitated set (r = .20, p = .158), or rarely imitated actions (r = .07, p = .629). This study of automatic imitation specifically tests predictions of the ASL model of 531 imitation in children. Unsurprisingly, given the impressive imitative skills of children from the 532 age of three we found a significant automatic imitation effect for both sets of actions when 533 examining reaction time (see Figure 2) , and the number of mistakes made in each condition.
534
However, it is the difference in automatic imitation effects between action sets that is of the predicts that associations between sensory and motor representations of actions are formed 537 through experience and so actions that receive more of this particular type of sensorimotor 538 experience should be quicker to imitate and more difficult to inhibit. Commonly imitated 539 actions were not imitated quicker than rarely imitated actions overall, however, incompatible 540 responses to commonly imitated actions were significantly slower than incompatible responses 541 to rarely imitated actions. This resulted in a significantly greater automatic imitation effect in 542 the commonly imitated set when examining reaction times. However, note that while this result 543 may suggest that incompatible trials are driving the AI effect, as each action has its own level 544 of motoric difficulty, this may not be the case; for example, a clap may take longer to complete 545 than a point in general, however, when imitating, the advantage granted clapping may be 546 greater than that afforded pointing and so RTs are instead comparable in this condition). This 547 finding supports an experiential account of imitation, demonstrating that inhibition of a learned 548 imitative response varies in line with predictions of previous social sensorimotor experience.
549
Overall, more mistakes were made when participants were required to respond with 550 incompatible actions, and more mistakes were made when responding to rarely imitated 551 actions. However, there was no interaction between response rule and action set, suggesting 552 the automatic imitation effect measured in this context did not vary in line with predictions of 553 synchronous experience. While inconsistent with the reaction time analysis, the failure to find 554 a significant effect here may be driven by a tradeoff between speed and accuracy that is found 555 in choice reaction-time paradigms (Wood & Jennings, 1976) . Also, it is unclear why more 556 mistakes were made overall in the rarely imitated set, but as the reaction time analyses only 557 considered correct trials, this difference is unlikely to impact these findings.
558
Further evidence in support of a domain-general account is provided by our finding that 559 the greatest automatic imitation effect was found when responding to clapping stimuli, an under the present paradigm automatic imitation is likely to function in conjunction with 623 working memory and other inhibitory effects, but as this study is more orientated towards examining the extent of automatic imitation across different contexts where memory load and 625 inhibitory context are kept constant, we believe this interaction does not affect our conclusions.
626
Nonetheless, future studies with children should attempt to isolate automatic imitation effects.
627
It could be argued that the effect of action-set on automatic imitation is driven solely 628 by the fact that one action in the CIS produced a sound, while neither action in the RIS produced 629 sound. Under this interpretation, the difference in automatic imitation observed between sets 630 is not driven by previous experience of synchrony but by an interaction between action-and 631 sound-compatibility. While a valid observation, a similar argument could be made for any 632 perceptual feature unique to a specific action, and in this study we did not aim to, and could produced by an action to be performed, and more work is needed for this effect to be fully 639 understood. However, even if sound-compatibility was the primary driver of the difference 640 across action-sets, the initial development of a link between the perceptual and motor 641 representations of an action (so called event codes, see Hommel, 2004; or common codes, see 642 Prinz, 1997) would be facilitated by the previous experience of that action in both asocial and 643 social contexts. The performance of an action in synchrony with others, for example, would 644 help develop a richer stimulus-set with which to facilitate action planning at a later stage, and 645 sound production would just be one element of the event code. Sound-compatibility may be an 646 important driver of this compatibility-effect, even potentially the sole driver, however, it is not 647 possible to disentangle the effect of previous experience of synchronous action from specific 648 stimulus-components of an action (e.g., sound) from this data. Only future empirical work with this paradigm will identify the impact of each stimulus-element on these compatibility effects 650 and how prior social experience interacts with these stimuli-effects.
651
It is important to note here that the theoretical perspectives that account for action 652 planning in the asocial domain described by Prinz (1997) and others (e.g., Hommell, 2004), 653 are largely consistent with the account that examines this effect in the social domain (e.g., the 654 ASL approach to imitation). In fact, following from this perspective, it could be argued that 655 different automatic imitation effects are driven by the mere frequency of action performance, 656 rather than social experience (e.g., imitative or synchronous action). Indeed, an experiential 657 view of imitation does not necessarily require experience to be social in nature. For example, 658 associations between sensory and motor representation of the same actions can develop through than waving or clapping. Importantly, the differences identified in this study are not solely 664 related to the motor performance of these actions but the sensory context preceding their 665 performance which is specifically social in nature, and so these results are directly applicable 666 to the domain of social imitation, rather than action performance alone. 667 We acknowledge that a limitation of our study is that our assumptions regarding 668 previous social experience were not based upon observations of adult-child or peer interactions, 669 but instead, upon a priori consideration of specific behaviors that are known to be coordinated 670 in time through social convention. As mentioned in the introduction, clapping (as performed in 671 applause for example) and waving (as performed as a greeting/departure display) have specific 672 social significance in the country where this study was performed that will lead to actions being 673 performed synchronously (or at least, resulting in these actions being temporally clustered), 
